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Conflict and Identity in Massachusetts: 
The Louisbourg Expedition of 1745 * 
by s. E. D. SHORTT** 
The conquest of Louisbourg by a combined British and colonial force 
in 1745 represented more than a creditable military victory: for eighteenth-
century Massachusetts it became an event of immense symbolic importance. 1 
The 17 40's brought to a head certain long-term trends in colonial society 
and in addition, witnessed the sudden unleashing of the Great Awakening, 
the Land Bank controversy, and the bitter war with France. By destroying 
the religious homogeneity of Massachusetts, the Awakening removed the 
traditional basis of the colony's social cohesion. The currency question 
and threat of military disaster simply added to the chaos of the existing 
identity crisis. Falling in the middle of this decade of turmoil, the Louis-
bourg expedition assumed the symbolic attributes necessary for the con-
struction of a new Massachusetts identity. Certainly, the clergy retained 
somewhat more traditional viewpoints and merit separate consideration. 
But for the majority in the colony the expedition became a symbol of pride 
and unity, of a cautious but viable sense of provincial awareness. In less 
than three decades the legacy of this secular affection for Massachusetts 
would permanently alter the British colonial system. 
I 
The original Puritan design to regenerate Europe by the creation of 
an exemplary "citty on a hill" was rapidly displaced by a desire to conquer 
America, to construct a "zion in the wilderness." 2 This new focus for 
Puritan zeal represented an abandonment of certain Winthropian ideals, 
* The author wishes to thank Professor G. A. Rawlyk of Queen's University, in 
whose 1969-70 graduate seminar a version of this paper was presented, for his exten-
sive advice and encouragement. 
** Ph.D. candidate, Department of History, Queen's University. 
1 A number of American historians have adopted symbols as analytic tools. 
For example: John W. WARD, "The Meaning of Lindbergh's Flight," American 
Quarterly, X, 1958; Henry Nash SMITH, Virgin Land, The American West as 
Symbol and Myth, (New York: 1950); J. W. WARD, Andrew Jackson, Symbol for 
An Age, (New York, 1962); Leo MARX, The Machine in The Gardin, (New York, 
1967); Roderick NASH, Wilderness and the American Mind, (New York, 1967). See 
also Rush WELTER, "The History of Ideas in America: An Essay in Redefinition", 
Journal of American History, 51, 1965. A very different type of symbols analysis has 
been undertaken by Richard L. MERRITT in Symbols of American Community, 1735-
1775, (New Haven, 1966). His research attempts to document the growth of American 
nationalism by statistical measurement of place name usage in the colonial press from 
1735 to 1775. According to Merritt, the years between 1739 and 1748 saw a definite 
slump in colonial community awareness (p. 156). The following paper takes sharp 
exception to this statement. 
2 See Alan HEIMERT, "Puritanism, the Wilderness, and The Frontier", New 
England Quarterly, 26, 1953. 
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or in Perry Miller's phrase, "declension in a Bible Commonwealth." 3 Yet 
if Massachusetts failed in the seventeenth century to realize the original 
mission, a stable and cohesive society was nevertheless created. By tacit 
agreement, and with. the aid of evolving federal theology, the colonists 
slowly settled for something less than a community of "visible saints." The 
result was a patriarchal society, organized in small towns, and deriving 
legitimacy from communal consensus. By the middle of the eighteenth 
century, however, this ideal also faced declension. Land was scarce, the 
family declined as a unit of social control, and, despite increased individual 
mobility, social stratification had hardened into class distinctions. 4 This 
disintegration of stable homogeneity in Massachusetts finally became overt, 
according to Kenneth Lockridge, during the "Great Awakening." He ob-
serves: "All the groups thus emerging - religious groups as well as the 
merchants and land speculators - ... by the middle of the eighteenth cen-
tury ... had shattered the old politics of Christian corporatism." 5 
If certain long-term social changes peaked in the 17 40's, the decade 
also experienced unprecedented immediate conflict. Most divisive was the 
Great Awakening. According to the Reverend Charles Chauncy of Boston, 
the revival " 'tis properly a disease, a sort of maddness . . . PoPERY itself 
hasn't been the mother of more and greater blasphemies and abominations." 6 
While defending the Awakening, the Reverend Jonathan Edwards of North 
Hampton was well aware of its potential dangers. "There is nothing that 
belongs to Christian experience," he warned, "that is more liable to a cor-
rupt mixture than zeal." 7 What both these clerics feared, despite their 
3 Perry MILLER, "Declension in a Bible Commonwealth," Nature's Nation, 
(Cambridge: 1967). Darrett B. RUTMAN suggests in Winthrop's Boston, Portrait of 
A Puritan Town, 1630-1649, (Chapel Hill, 1965), that the declension was well estab-
lished by 1650. Other historians such as R. S. DUNN, Puritans and Yankees. The 
Winthrop Dynasty of New England, 1630-1717, (Princeton, 1962) and Bernard BAILYN, 
The New England Merchants in the Seventeenth Century, (New York, 1965), set the 
date at approximately 1700. Cf. Robert G. POPE, The Half-Way Covenant, (Princeton, 
1969). 
4 See Kenneth LocKRIDGE, "Land, Population, and the Evolution of New 
England Society, 1630-1790," Past and Present. 39, 1968; Kenneth LOCKRIDGE and Alan 
KREIDER, "The Evolution of Massachusetts Town Government, 1640-1740," William 
and Mary Quarterly, 23, 1966; Kenneth LOCKRIDGE, The New England Town, the 
First Hundred Years, (New York, 1970); Philip GREVEN, Four Generations, Population,, 
Land, and Family in Colonial Andover, Massachusetts, (Ithaca, 1970); R. M. ZEMSKY, 
"Power, Influence, and Status: Leadership Patterns in the Massachusetts Assembly, 
1740-1755," William and Mary Quarterly, 26, 1969; Jesse LEMISH, "The American 
Revolution seen from the Bottom Up," in B. J. BERNSTEIN, Towards a New Past, 
(New York, 1968); Jackson Turner MAIN, The Social Structure of Revolutionary 
America, (Princeton, 1965). Cf. R. E. BROWN, Middle Class Democracy and the 
Revolution in Massachusetts, 1691-1780, (Ithaca, 1955) and Michael ZUCKERMAN, 
Peacable Kingdoms, New England Towns in the Eighteenth Century, (New York, 
1970). Note also R. L. BUSHMAN'S Study of Connecticut, From Puritans to Yankees, 
(Cambridge, 1967). 
5 LocKRIDGE, The New England Town, 171. 
6 Charles CHAUNCEY, Enthusiasm Described and Cautioned Against, (Boston, 
1742), r~orinted in Alan HEIMERT and Perry MILLER, The Great Awakening, (New 
York, 1967), 231, 243. 
7 Jonathan EDWARDS, Some Thoughts concerninf? the Present Revival of Religion 
in New England, in HEIMERT and MILLER, op. cit., 278. 
CONFLICT AND IDENTITY IN MASSACHUSETTS... 167 
theological differences, was the destruction of a sense of community. By 
openly destroying the already weakened structure of federal theology the 
revival removed the traditional basis for Massachusetts' self-identity and 
social cohesion. Under the old federal theory personal salvation and na-
tional identity had been bound by the connection of the covenant of grace 
to the civil covenant. After the Awakening, the revivalists, or New Lights, 
emphasized individual regeneration and rejected the national covenant; na-
tional spirit, if it was to exist at all, was forced to reach the Awakened 
through means outside religion. The Liberal clergy, meanwhile, drifted 
towards open Arminianism with its concomitant rejection of traditional 
Calvinist theological assumption concerning the nature of man and his rela-
tionship to society. New Lights, Liberals, and Traditionalists vied with each 
other for doctrinal supremacy, but never again would religion form the 
basis for Massachusetts identity. As Chauncy lamented of the Great 
Awakening, "It has promoted faction and contention, filled the Church 
often-times with confusion, and the state sometimes with general disorder." 8 
Religion was by no means the only divisive issue of the 1740's; of 
considerable importance as well was the Land Bank controversy. William 
Douglass, the contemporary historian, considered the colony "in a state of 
lawless Bankruptcy," while another pamphleteer complained "the Times 
are hard and Money scarce." 9 Indeed, existing paper currency had de-
preciated by 1739 to one-fifth its face value and Boston's external trade 
had declined rapidly after 1735. 10 To combat the resulting business de-
pression a group of inland promoters, supported by back~ountry debtors 
and violently opposed by most Boston merchants, demanded the establish-
ment of a land bank system of paper currency. 11 The ensuing debate 
proved both lengthy and acrimonious. Enemies of the scheme labelled the 
exponents "a few evil-minded Men" who "Debauched the Minds of the 
People, by Instilling unto them some pernicious Principles, destructive of 
Society and good Government." 12 Obviously the economics of recession 
spilled naturally into politics. Already Governor Jonathan Belcher of Mas-
sachusetts was embroiled in controversy over the enforcement of British 
forestry laws. By siding with the hard-money group of Boston, he soon 
found himself opposed to both the newly elected House of Representatives 
8 CHAUNCY, Enthusiasms Described . .. , 243. 
9 An Essay Concerning Silver and Paper Currencies, More especially with 
Regards to the British Colonies in New-England, <Boston, 173 8), reprinted in Andrew 
McFarland DAVIS, Colonial Currency Reprints, 1682-1751, (New York, n.d.), III, p. 229, 
and ANON., A Letter Relating to a Medium of Trade, in the Province of Massachusetts-
Bay, (Boston, 1740), in DAVIS, vol. IV, 4. 
10 Theodore THAYER, "The Land Bank Systems in the American Colonies," 
Journal of Economic History, XIII, 1953, 151; Carl BRIDENBAUGH, Cities in the 
Wilderness, (New York, 1966), 330; A. H. CoLE, Wholesale Commodity Prices in 
the United States, 1700-1861, (Cambridge, 1938) Aopendix A. 
11 John SCHUTZ, William Shirley, (Chapel Hill, 1961), 37-38. 
12 [William DoUGLASS ?], A Letter to Merchant in London Concerning a late 
Combination in the Province of the Massachusetts-Bay in New-England to Impose 
or Force a Private Currency called Land-Bank-Money, (Boston, 1740), in DAVIS, 
Vol. IV, 72 and 76. 
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and the Council. 13 But the debate extended well beyond the legislature, 
for the controversy appeared to "spirit the People to Mutiny, Sedition, and 
Riots." In fact, "they had persuaded themselves that the Acts of Parliament 
[prohibiting the land bank] could not be carried into Execution and even 
bid Defiance to the Government by their threats." 14 What had begun as 
an internal economic dispute threatened to errupt into a colonial rebellion. 
To religious strife and the bitterness of the currency debate was added 
the threat of war with France. Governor William Shirley, who had replaced 
Belcher in 17 41, summarized the military chaoo which confronted him during 
his first year in office: 
As to the state of the province, the treasury is empty; Castle William, 
the chief fortress and key of the province, and all its garrison forts and 
fortifications are out of repair and are in a defenseless condition and in 
danger of being desserted by the officers and men to who arrears of wage 
are due.15 
Indeed, the Governor had good reason to fear the vulnerability of New 
England. From Louisbourg on Cape Breton and Quebec on the St. Law-
rence, to Frontenac and Detroit in the Great Lakes basin, and finally to 
Crevecour, Kakaskie, and New Orleans in the Mississippi Valley, the French 
North American empire encircled the British Colonies. The French and 
their Indian allies used this extended frontier to harass New England. 16 
After 17 44 when war finally broke out between France and Britain, the 
Indian problem was augmented by the activities of French privateers oper-
ating out of Louisbourg. In the summer and fall of that year ten New 
England ships were captured. 17 Clearly defense against New France was 
a major problem for Massachusetts. 
For over a century Massachusetts had been approaching the crises of 
the 1740's. The old unity and simplicity of patriarchal, theocratic, con-
sensus communities was displaced by a heterogeneous and individualistic 
colonial society. The Great Awakening revealed an openly divided clergy 
and arranged the Congregational churches, in Edwards' phrase, "into two 
armies, separated and drawn up in battle array." 18 Religion, which had 
long provided the unity that bound citizens to each other and to their 
province, had become a divisive force. Nor could secular affairs provide 
1 3 ANON., An Account of the Rise, Progress, and Consequences of the two 
late Schemes Commonly call'd the Land-Bank or Manufactory Scheme and the Silver 
Scheme, in the Province of the Massachusetts-Bay, (Boston, 1744), in DAVIS, Vol. IV, 
305; J. C. MILLER, "Religion, Finance, and Democracy in Massachusetts", N ew 
England Quarterly, 6, 1, 1933, 41; and for a description of Belcher's see SCHUTZ, 34. 
14 [William DOUGLASS?], A Letter .... in DAVIS, 78 and ANON., An Account . .. , 
in DAVIS, IV, 287-288. . 
11; C. H. LINCOLN, Correspondence of William Shirley, Vol. I (New YorkJ 
1912), p. 76, Shirley to the Duke of Newcastle, Oct. 17, 1741. 
16 See G. A. RAWLYK, Yankees at Louisbourg, (Orono, 1966), 16-19, for an 
account of the pervasive fear of Indian raids in the 1740's. 
17 Ibid., 20-21. 
18 Cited in E. S. GAUSTAD, The Great Awakening in New England, (New York , 
1957), 67. 
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the material to create a new sense of unity. The land bank issue pitted 
debtor against creditor, new merchants against old, rural areas against urban. 
And overshadowing this internal turmoil was the omnipresent fear of war 
with French. Divided within and threatened without, Massachusetts was 
set adrift. Until some momentous event provided a focus around which a 
new collective character could form, the province experienced a severe 
identity crisis. 19 
II 
When the makeshift force of colonial recruits set sail for Louisbourg 
in the year 1745, they embarked upon a mission of crucial importance. 
They undertook, in the clergy's phrase, "the avenging of Israel." 2<1 Initially 
the French fortress was a symbol of fear representing the entire spectrum 
of tensions and tribulations afflicting Massachusetts. If the foe were over-
come, the victory would signify the vindication of the province. Tempered 
in battle, the colony could face the future with confidence and unity. For 
would not success signify that God did not demand religious homogeneity 
in Massachusetts ? And would it not also provide economic advancement 
as well as military security ? Triumph at Louisbourg was in a sense, the 
symbolic solution to Massachusetts' identity crisis. 
Cape Breton was, immediately before 1745, a symbol of fear for the 
Bay colony. There had been an element of paranoia present in Massachusetts 
from its founding which periodically became overt - during the Hutchinson 
and Williams controversies in the 1630's, at the time of King Philip's War 
in 1675, and most noticably, in the Salem Witch trials during the last 
decade of the seventeenth century. This emotion stemmed from the cir-
cumstances under which the Puritans had set out to plant their "citty on a 
hill". Harried from England, the founders identified with the wandering 
and persecuted Israelites. By the mid-eighteenth century, much of this fear 
was focused on the threat of French aggression. Louisbourg, by its French-
ness, symbolized the decadence of the Old World, especially the evils of 
Roman Catholicism. At the same time, through the unholy alliance between 
the Indians and the French, it represented the heathen threat of the New 
World. With the reduction of Louisbourg, the burden of fear would be 
largely purged from the mind of New England. Though fear of French 
assault would return during the 1750's, the stark terror of the previous 
years had been greatly diminished. Though paranoia would also return, as 
Bernard Bailyn suggests, during the revolutionary period, 21 this fear would 
19 See Darrett Rutman's perceptive use of Eric H. Erikson's concept of identity 
crisis in American Puritanism, (New York, 1970), especially page 126 where he 
suggests the Great A wakening was part of such a crisis. 
2<l Thomas PRENTICE, A Sermon on the Reduction of Cape Breton, (Boston, 
1745), 33 . and Charles CHAUNCY, A Thanksgiving Sermon for the Reduction of Cape 
Breton, (Boston, 17 45), 20. 
21 Bernard BAILYN. The ldeolof!ical Origins of the American Revolution, 
(Cambridge, 1967), especially Chapter IV. 
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be of a radically different type. It rested on the premonition that certain 
diabolical English interests plotted to destroy the rights of a viable colonial 
society. In 17 45 the root of the paranoia was exactly the opposite; the 
people of Massachusetts, in the throes of an identity crisis, feared the success 
of French aggression precisely because they doubted the viability of their 
own divided and dispirited colony. But the success at Louisbourg, through 
the pride and solidarity it engendered, purged this fear and in fact, provided 
the rudimentary provincial awareness necessary for the later paranoia de-
scribed by Bailyn. 
Before 1745 much of Louisbourg's terror derived from the fact that 
it was a very likely base for French expansion into New England particu-
larly if Nova Scotia were considered a part of the latter's territory. 22 
Governor Shirley articulated this fear: 
. . . if Cape Breton is not reduced, there appears to be a great danger that 
the French will soon be masters of Nova Scotia, the consequences of which 
would be the addition of 4 or 5,000 fighting men to the enemy immediately 
from the inhabitants of that province who, in conjunction with the Indians 
of all tribes and assistance from Canada, would over-run and destroy all 
our eastern settlements as far as Plymouth itself . . . and whether they 
stop there may be some question. 23 
This fear of the French at Louisbourg was unfounded for the fortress and 
its garrison were in a deplorable condition. 24 Yet as frequently occurs 
during periods of acute disorientation, there was in Massachusetts in 1745, 
a widening gap between objective reality and perceived reality. The people 
of Massachusetts had, since the late l 730's, yearly anticipated war 25 with 
what one cleric termed "our natural enemy the French." 26 For a number 
of reasons the designation of the French as "natural" foes seemed widely 
accepted. In a period of economic recession in Massachusetts the com-
mercial revival of France was viewed with concern 27 and the competition 
in trade and fisheries from Cape Breton was considered particularly dan-
gerous. 28 The French and their Indian allies were seen as minions of 
popery, plotting to destroy the religion of New England and the civil and 
political liberties of her citizens. 29 Finally, in 17 44, Massachusetts had 
22 An anonymous member of the Louisbourg expedition wrote in his journal 
that the Gut of Canso "cuts of [sic] Cape- Bre -tn from our Eastern shore". 
L. E. DEFOREST, ed., Louisbourg Journals, 1745, (New York, 1932), 5. 
23 LINCOLN, 177, Shirley to Benning Wentworth, January 31 , 1744. 
24 Thomas HUTCHINSON, The History of Massachusetts, (Boston, 1795), I, 363. 
25 Ibid. , 366. 
26 Jared ELIOT, Sermon Occasioned by the Taking of the City of Louisbourg, 
(London, 1747), 24. 
27 W. J. ECCLES, The Canadian Frontier, 1534-1760, (New York, 1969), 150. 
28 The economic threat of Cape Breton was greatly exaggerated. In fact, the 
French were forced to trade with New England for supplies (Raw/yk, XVii) and 
found it cheaper to purchase fish at Canso rather than to catch their own. Hutchinson, 
366. Nevertheless, the economic threat of Ile Royale was constantly emphasized in 
Massachusetts. See. for examole, the Boston Evening Post, May 13, 1745. 
21l Pepperrell PAPERS. Collections of the Massachusetts Historical Society, Sixth 
Series, Vol. X (Boston, 1899), 106, John Gorey to Sir William Pepperrell, February 
24, 1744. (Hereafter cited as Pepperrell Papers.) 
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been given vivid proof of the immediacy of defense problems when a 
French force captured the Massachusetts' fishing outpost of Canso and 
launched an attack against Annapolis Royal, Nova Scotia's tiny capital. 30 
Specific external groups were often considered part of the threat im-
posed by Louisbourg. The Indians were perhaps the most obvious example. 
One of Shirley's correspondents wrote of the Six Nations: "These people 
are very numerous and if they should be drawn to the French interest they 
will be worse to us than all Canada." 31 To the east, the threat came from 
Acadia-Nova Scotia, described by a member of the council of Nova Scotia 
as "a colony of rattle snakes." 32 It was feared that the bucolic Acadians 
would rise up to expell the English at the least French incitement. 33 A 
third group feared by Massachusetts were the inhabitants of New France. 
As early as 1743, Shirley, anticipating trouble on the Western frontier, 
raised ten companies of "Snowshoe Men" and erected "a line of block-
houses and garrisons around the frontier parts which lie exposed to the 
French." 34 With Louisbourg as its focal point, and with Indians, Acadians, 
and les Canadiens as specific complements, a sense of fear pervaded Mas-
sachusetts in 1745. 
In times of earlier crisis Massachusetts had turned to the instrument 
of the jeremiad for confidence and unity. 35 By 1745, however, the religious 
homogeneity of the province had been largely shattered and the utility of 
jeremiads was no longer universally accepted. Instead, New England launched 
the largest military expedition of its pre-177 6 history against the supposed 
source of its difficulties, Louisbourg, and found, perhaps for the first time, 
a secular means by which to preserve the province. The result of this secular 
salvation was a transformation in colonial self-identity. No longer were 
New Englanders sinners in the hands of an omnipotent and usually angry 
God; on the contrary, they were proud and pragmatic New Englanders, 
confident now of their own ability and solidarity. Louisbourg became a 
symbol, then, around which the new Massachusetts' character could take 
form. 
The symbolic value of the Louisbourg victory was immediately obvious 
to the colonials. Governor Shirley was confident that the Indians would 
no longer harass New England when the news of Cape Breton's demise 
was proclaimed. Explaining two attacks at Broad Bay and George's Fort, 
the Governor illustrated this assumption: 
We impute this rupture to a false report spread by the French among 
the Indians y•• we were defeated and cut off at Louisbourg, to prevent the 
ill effects of which I had, before we had an account of the Indians breaking 
so William McCLENACHAN, The Christian Warrior: A Sermon, (Boston, 1745), 
10-11. 
31 Lincoln, 210, John Stoddard to Shirley, April 24, 1745. 
32 Pepoerrell Papers, 435, William Shirreff to Pepperrell, January 17, 1745. 
33 LINCOLN, 146, Shirley to Newcastle, Sept. 22, 1744. 
34 Ibid., 115, Shirley to Newcastle. March 19, 1744. 
35 See MILLER, "Declension in a Bible Commonwealth". 
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out sent an express to inform the Penokscott and Norridgewalk tribes of 
our success at Cape Breton . • . But by express arrived at George's Fort 
one day too late. However, the Indians knew it by this time, and I am 
apt to think it will have an effect. 36 
In a similar fashion, it was believed that the Louisbourg conquest would 
quell incipient revolt among the Acadians. Quoting Major Phillips of Anna-
polis Royal, Shirley reported: 
Inhabitants of Nova Scotia at the first news of Louisbourg being sur-
rendered were in great consternation and at Minas in particular they ap-
peared in tears in public places, where nine months before they had assisted 
in signing Te Deum on a false report that Annapolis Royal was surrendered 
to Monsieur Duvivier. 37 
Even the fear of French Canada was mitigated. Though William Pepperrell, 
the commander-in-chief of the expedition, wrote to Shirley that "the chief, 
if not only danger of the frontier is from the Canada men," 38 the old 
element of terror was gone. Benning Wentworth, Governor of New Hamp-
shire reflected this new attitude when he predicted: 
I am convinced the reduction of Louisbourg would so dispirit the 
enemy that we might make an entire conquest of the French in North 
America and then the French war would be the happiest war New England 
ever engaged in. 39 
Louisbourg, initially a symbol of fear and insecurity, had been transformed 
through conquest into symbol of hope. 
The new spirit was illustrated by the tremendous pride which the New 
Englanders exhibited in reaction to the conquest. Though July 18 was 
designated as a public fast-day to praise God for victory and references 
were made to Divine blessing, the majority of celebration rhetoric was 
overwhelmingly secular. Something of the spirit of the occasion is evident 
from the Boston Evening Post's description of the festivities: 
The inhabitants . . . laid aside all thoughts of business and each one 
strived to out-do his neighbour in expressions of joy ... the day was spent 
in firing of cannon, feasting, and drinking of healths, and in preparing 
fireworks . . . in the fields were several bonfires for the less polite besides 
a large one in the common, where was a tent erected and plenty of good 
liquor for all that would drink. In a word, never before on any occasion, 
was observed so universal and unaffected joy . .. 40 
Despite the magnitude of the celebration, God, for the first time in Mas-
sachusetts' history, was uninvited. Only the clerics whole-heartedly ascribed 
victory to vagaries of Divine will. 
36 Pepperrell Papers, 339, Shirley to Pepperrell, July 29, 1745. 
37 LINCOLN, 298, Shirley to Newcastle, December 14, 1745. 
3 8 Pepperrell Papers, 348, Pepperrell to Shirley, August 6, 1745. 
39 LINCOLN, 287, Wentworth to Shirley, April 12, 1745. 
40 Boston Post Boy, July 8, 1745. Similar, though less exuberant outbursts 
occurred in other colonies. See, for example, the Boston Gazette's (July 23, 1745) 
account of New York's celebrations. 
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Instead of thanking Providence, the people of Massachusetts seemed 
to accept Governor Shirley's opinion that Louisbourg "was won . . . by the 
bravery and indefatigable toil of his majesty's New-England subjects." 41 
More specifically, they viewed the victory as a Massachusetts achievement 42 
and were incensed at Commodore Peter Warren's apparent attempt to claim 
British naval credit for the conquest. Nathaniel Sparhawk, son-in-law to 
William Pepperrell, observed: 
We flatter ourselves when you shall have the leisure to represent 
things in their true light, that neither the glory of our country or its Gen-
eral shall receive any eclipse or be in ye least sullied by the proud and 
aspiring. 43 
Pepperrell himself was anxious concerning credit for his forces and wrote: 
I find many in the army . . . very desirous that some suitable person 
should go to England that their services in this expedition may be justly 
and fully represented. 44 
The House of Representatives in an address to Shirley resolved that the 
Governor's command should not be usurped by Warren nor should the 
Commodore be allowed to mislead British authorities. 45 The address was 
superfluous, for Shirley already felt Warren's actions would be "very pre-
judiced to his majesty's service in all the colonies of New England by 
putting an end to expeditions from hence for his majesty's service." 46 
The emphasis on New England's achievement resulted in a glorification 
of the Louisbourg troops. Neglected were the facts that many soldiers had 
never used a firearm before enlisting, that some recruits were octagenarians, 
that sickness and disease took many lives, and that shortly after the conquest 
a spirit of mutiny was apparent in the ranks. 47 Instead, the image of the 
typical soldier was the prototype of the rough and ready American fron-
tiersman. The courage of the troops was seemingly without equal: 
The French say they are like Devils, for the hotter they fire, the nearer 
advances they made to their fire; and let what will be said to their pre-
judice, four times their number of regular troops would not have under-
gone the Herculean labours of drawing 42 pounders over hills and dales, 
rocks and swamp 3 or 4 miles. 48 
Though untrained, the colonial militia were very efficient in the use of 
their weapons: 
... being generally good marks-men, [they] picked off the enemy with their 
sma:ll arms from their walls and in the city, in such a manner, that at last 
they [French] could not show their heads without running a very great 
risque of their lives. 49 
41 Boston Gazette, July 23, 1745. 
42 Ibid., and July 16, 1745. 
43 Pepperrell Papers, 336, Nathaniel Sparhawk to Pepperrell, July 20, 1745. 
44 LINCOLN, 232, Pepperrell to Shirley, July 4, 1745. 
4-0 Boston Gazette, July 30, 1745. 
46 LINCOLN, 236, Shirley to Pepperrell, July 7, 1745. 
47 DEFOREST, 5, 21, 65. 
48 Boston Weekly News Letter, July 25, 1745. 
49 Boston Gazette, July 16, 1745. 
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Yet the troops, for all their martial zeal, were not given to "intemperences 
or universally debaunched in their manners." On the contrary: 
. . . for the generality they were men who had upon their minds an awe 
of God and feared an oath ... willing to venture their lives, not so much 
to serve themselves as to promote the public good. 50 
The combipation of valour and higher purpose which characterized the 
colonial soldiers •led one observer to cry, "I challenge any army in Europe 
to produce three thousand stouter, braver men, filled with more resolution." 51 
Here the confidence of New England is obvious. The entire spirit of pride -
almost arrogance - was succinctly captured by a soldier-poet: 
When Christian Lewis comes to hear what's done, 
With his strong fortress on the Isle Breton, 
He'll swear the valour of the British breed, 
In Western climes their grandsires far exceed. 52 
Though New England previously claimed moral superiority over Old England, 
surely this spirit of secular superiority was something radically new, some-
thing produced by the symbolic significance of the Louisbourg conquest. 
H pride was a facet in the image of the Louisbourg conquest, so too 
was a dynamic feeling of community solidarity. Recalling the expedition, 
Thomas Hutchinson, a future governor of Massachusetts, wrote that it pro-
claimed "a generous, noble public spirit." 53 According to Governor Shirley, 
support for the expedition came from "the fishermen in particular and the 
people of the province in general." He also claimed, "Petitions have been 
preferred by a considerable number of the inhabitants of this province re-
presenting ... the great importance of the reduction" of Louisbourg. 54 The 
Massachusetts General Court supported the Governor's attitude when it 
noted "a general disposition in all ranks of people to exert themselves in 
their several spheres" on behalf of the expedition. 55 In the festivities which 
followed the conquest, public unity was equally apparent. According 
to the Boston Evening Post, "the churl and niggard became generous and 
even the poor forgot their poverty," while the Gazette reported that "the 
people of all ranks arose from their beds to joy and thanksgiving, and each 
one severally contributed their part . . . with a surprising decency and good 
order." 56 Such community spirit was a far cry from the divisive days of 
·-w- CHAUNCY, A Thanksgiving Sermon ... , 14. 
111 Extract from a reader's letter, Boston Evening Post, July 15, 1745. 
52 Ibid., July 29, 1745. The British were aware of the colonial pride in their 
troops and feared its consequences. The Duke of Bedford, first lord of the admiralty, 
advised against the extensive use of colonial troops in the future due to "the indepen-
dence it may create in those provinces towards their mother country, when they see 
within themselves so great an army possessed in their own right by conquest, of so 
great an extent of country . . . " Cited in G. A. Wooo, William Shirley, A History, 
Vol. I (New York, 1920) 318. 
53 Hutchinson, 377. 
54 LINCOLN, 161, Shirley to Newcastle, Jan. 14, 1744, and 171, Shirley to 
Jonathan Law, Jan. 29, 1744. 
55 Boston Evening Post, July 15, 1745. 
56 Ibid., July 8, 1745 and Boston Gazette, July 9, 1745. 
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George Whitefield's first visit 57 or the fury of the currency controversy. 
It was also a new type of unity quite distinct from the civil covenant which 
had provided social cohesion in previous years. The new spirit was a product 
of the success at Louisbourg: it was a cautious but viable provincial 
awareness. 58 
This new colonial identity had less illusive characteristics than pride 
and sense of community. The Louisbourg conquest was also seen as a 
basis for the commercial and territorial expansion of Massachusetts. Nova 
Scotia was already considered a part of New England; together with Cape 
Breton it was to become a copy of Massachusetts society. The Reverend 
Benjamin Colman, Pepperrell's brother-in-law, wrote to the Colonel that 
he had recommended to English authorities: 
that Annapolis might no longer remain an unprofitable and expensive 
garrison to ye crown, but be put under a civil government, and ye same 
respecting Louisbourg that families and towns and churches (by ye wil of 
God) may multiply ... 59 
Writing to the Lords of Trade, Governor Shirley took much the same 
position. He suggested the settlement of Cape Breton by New England 
fishermen and soldiers, and argued, because of Louisbourg's proximity to 
Massachusetts and its beneficial effect on the province's trade, that the new 
area be placed under his jurisdiction. 60 There are indications that the 
colonists viewed the annexation of Cape Breton as a stepping-stone to the 
establishment of a New England hegemony over the northern half of the 
continent. Pepperrell referred to Louisbourg as "the key to Canada" while 
Shirley turned his attention - even before the conquest - to plans for 
attacking the French in Canada. 61 Certainly Shirley's plans were defensive, 
but he was also very conscious of the economic gains - specifically re-
garding the fur trade and fisheries - likely to accrue to Massachusetts 
through the reduction of Canada. 62 
Shirley was not alone in considering the fall of Louisbourg as a 
harbinger of New England economic gain. According to the Boston Gazette, 
the conquest "must be of as much consequence to the trade and fisheries of 
these northern colonies, as Gibralter is to the trade of the Mediterranean". 63 
57 When George Whitefield returned to Massachusetts in the late summer of 
1745, the Boston Evening Post (Aug. 8, 1745) expressed fear that the religious contro-
versy which was "almost ended" would be rekindled to the detriment of the emerging 
"harmony and peace". 
58 In his Cities in the Wilderness, Carl Bridenbaugh acknowledges the growth 
of civic consciousness as a result of problems which "required collective rather than 
individual efforts and powers for their control" (42). This would support the conclusion 
that a secular provincial awareness was possible by the mid-17 40's. 
59 Pepperrell Papers, 395, Benjamin Colman to Pepperrell, Nov. 9, 1745. 
60 LINcoLN, 244-245, Shirley to the Lords of Trade, July 10, 1745. 
61 Pepperrell Papers, 452, Pepperrell to Paul Mascarene, March 8, 1745, and 
Lincoln, 203, Shirley to Wentworth, April 8, 1745. 
62 LINCOLN, 163, Shirley to Newcastle, Jan. 14, 1745. 
~3 Boston Gazette, July 9, 1745. 
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The benefits expected from the victory were often of a negative type, that 
is, the French would be unable to harass English shipping and fisheries, 
would no rlonger possess an entrep0t for their own trade (especially that of 
the West Indies), and woU!ld lose their nursery for seamen. 64 The obvious 
assumption was that from each of these French disabilities it was Mas-
sachusetts which stood to gain. Other persons, however, were more positive 
in their approach to the economic advantages of conquest. Nathaniel Spar-
hawk wrote to his father-in~law, Pepperrell: 
I should be much obliged to you for any advices in point of trade 
between this [Boston] and Louisbourg . . . and if any fishing rooms may 
be laid out at Cape Breton and Canso without much cost, say for a small 
matter, be so good as to secure one at each place for it. 65 
Such opportunism was the essence of Yankee commercialism. It was Louis-
bourg which acted as a focus for this spirit and provided hope for the revival 
of prosperity in Massachusetts. 
Initially Louisbourg was a symbol of fear. Superficially it represented 
the threat of French aggression but the overwhelming joy at its reduction 
indicated its wider significance. Into Cape Breton had been projected all 
the tensions present in Massachusetts - the results of both long-term social 
change and the immediate conflicts of the 17 40's. The taking of the fortress 
exerted a cathartic effect on the province, replacing old fears and divisions 
with a new confidence and spirit of unity. Religious homogeneity, shattered 
by the Great Awakening, was displaced as the basis of Massachusetts' sense 
of identity. In its stead, there appeared an incipient "provincial awareness" 
characterized by secular pride and confidence in the vitality of Massachusetts. 66 
m 
For one important group, however, the victory at Cape Breton was 
primarily a religious symbol. The New England clergy, since 1740 in a 
position of greatly diminished prestige and authority, found support for their 
respective schools of theology in the reduction of Louisbourg. The ministers 
emphasized most of the usual secular themes - the courage of the troops, 
the unity of all ranks of society, and the beneficial economic consequences -
but for them the conquest held a particularly vital significance. It provided 
concrete evidence for their New Light, Traditional, or Liberal theological 
views. 67 Louisbourg became a symbol in support of, or in opposition to, 
64 Boston Evening Post, May 13, 1745. 
65 Peppe"ell Papers, 319, Sparhawk to Pepperrell, July 5, 1745. 
66 The Louisbourg victory had symbolic significance similar to American triumph 
in the Spanish American War. According to David Noble in The Progressive Mind, 
1890-1917, (Chicago, 1970), 15-19, the defeat of Spain was taken as proof that 
America had not abandoned her Protestant individualism and liberty for the medieval 
cultural complexity of Europe, that is, that urban-industrial growth was actually progress 
rather than cultural complexity. 
67 For example, the Boston Evening Post (August 2, 1742), lamenting the 
revivalist charges against the "unconverted clergy", complained that many people 
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theories of Divine intervention, Biblical authority, the war against antiChrist, 
God's purpose, the efficacy of prayer, and ultimately, universal theories of 
history. In order to understand the temper of New England in the 1740's, 
these theological symbols shall be examined. 
A point of departure for the clerical debate was the question as to 
whether the Louisbourg victory could be considered proof that God directly 
intervened in the affairs of man. The New Lights adopted a strict Calvinist 
position, contending that God "holds all events in his hand, acting above 
second causes or contrary to the ordinary course of them, at his pleasure". 68 
According to the Reverend Thomas Prince, while God operated in the 
corporal world through natural laws such as gravity, "it is most evident 
that he confines not himself to these". 69 This conviction reflected the reviv-
alists' belief in an arbitrary and relevant Providence. As well, it illustrated 
the transformation of federal theology, for Divine absolutism excluded all 
covenants and consequently, both the doctrine of preparation and the con-
cept of national or civil covenant. 
The Liberal position was opposed to such beliefs. According to the 
Reverend Charles Chauncy, while God accounted for New England's success, 
an important qualification was necessary: 
Not that God, in getting the victory, immediately exerts his right hand 
and holy arm. He does it ordinarily by the intervention of second causes, 
and of such as are naturally fitted in a human way, to accomplish his 
purpose. 70 
Chauncy expressed the Liberal belief that God had set the world in motion 
according to certain natural laws and refused to actively intervene in man's 
affairs. 71 According to such a belief, the civil covenant was again superfluous 
as was the instrument of the jeremiad. Rather, morality consisted in con-
formation to the dictates of Divine will as revealed in natural law. Further, 
the role of man as an immediate cause in controlling his own affairs was 
greatly enhanced. Accordingly, the Liberal clergy tended to stress the valour 
of the New Englanders in the expedition against Cape Breton. 72 
In contrast to both the Liberal and New Light clergy, stood the Tra-
ditionals. These ministers dismissed what they viewed as the revivalists' 
listened so these ''unjust and hard speeches belch'd out against their own proper 
pastors not only with patience but with pleasure". Cited in J. C. MILLER, 38. The 
clergv which are mentioned in the following pages fall into three general groups: 
Charles Channey and Jared Eliot were "Liberals", Prince and Sewell "New Lights" 
and Niles, Walter, Prentice and McLenachan "Traditionalists". 
68 Joseph SEWELL, A Sermon Preached at the Thursday-Lecture in Boston, 
(Boston, 1745), 19. 
69 Thomas PRINCE, Sermon on the Taking of Cape Breton, (Boston, 1745), 9. 
70 CHAUNCY, A Thanksgiving Sermon ... , 7. 
71 Alan HEIMERT, Religion and the American Mind, From the Great Awakening 
to the Revolution, (Cambridge, 1966), 134. (Hereafter cited as Heimerl). 
72 For example, Eliot (9-20) compiles a much more secular account of the 
expedition than does Prentice (32-38). 
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excessive and "unfederal" reliance on miracles. The Reverend William 
McClenachan condemned the 
Infatuated enthusiasts who exercise an unscriptural dependence on 
Providence, looking for such miracles as were in the days of Joshua [and] 
neglecting the use of means ... 73 
The error in the New Light position was obvious to Traditionalists: it 
negated the concept of covenants. According to Thomas Prentice, beneficial 
events must "be in answer to our humilitation and prayers, which imply in 
them a promise and vow of praise and obedience in case of an answer." 74 
Lest any doubted the efficacy of this jeremiad process, the Reverend Na-
thaniel Walter cited the Louisbourg conquest as proof: 
Not many months are past since we humbled ourselves before the 
Lord, lay low at his footstool for our crimes, and with utmost emestness 
of soul, begged his favour and protection. Kind Heaven lent a favourable 
ear to the requests of his people ... 75 
The various theological pursuasions in Massachusetts, then, fixed upon 
Louisbourg as a symbol to verify their respective views concerning the issue 
of direct Divine intervention in human affairs. In so doing, they revealed 
many of their assumption later be incorporated in differing theories of 
history. 
The clergy were less divided over the question as to whether the expe-
dition against Cape Breton symbolized the confrontation of Protestanism 
and the forces of anti Christ. Yet the emphasis implicit in their sermon 
again reflected basic theological differences. Most of the ministers accepted 
the view that the expedition was designed to relieve the people of Cape 
Breton of the ignorance arbitrarily imposed by the Papacy. "May his [God's] 
pure word be published and observed," preached the Reverend Joseph 
Sewell, "where the Man of Sin has prevailed to take away the Key of 
Knowledge." 76 Similarly, there appeared to be agreement that the expe-
dition would restore Christ to the position of authority usurped by the 
Roman Catholic hierarchy. As the Reverend Charles Chauncy phrased it, 
"May the Man of Sin, that Son of Perdition, be no longer acknowledged 
Christ's viceregent." 77 The New Light attitude towards the Roman foe was 
distinguished primarily by opposition to the doctrine of works. Wrote the 
Reverend Joseph Sewell: 
May the righteousness of Christ, and that only, be published as the 
meritous cause of our justification before God, and the pernicious doctrine 
of the merit of our works disappear ... 78 
73 McClenachan, 13. 
74 Prentice, 22. 
711 Nathanael WALTER, Sermon on the Character of a True Patriot, (Boston, 
1745), 18. 
76 SEWELL, 32. 
77 CHAUNCY, A Thanksgiving Day Sermon ... , 22. 
78 SEWELL, 33. 
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This position, however, was not unique, for it was shared by the Tradi-
tional Calvinists. After describing the French attachment to "masses, pater-
nosters . . . Ave Marias . . . saints statues . . . and beads," the Reverend 
Samuel Niles contemptuously wrote, "These meritorious acts as they pre-
tend, challenge rewards from God's Almighty hand." 79 Together both New 
Lights and Traditional clergy used the defeat of the Romish doctrine of 
works to symbolize the battle against the growing Arminianism of the Lib-
eral clergy in Massachusetts. It mattered little to the Traditionalists that 
''works" grew out of their own doctrine of preparation; what was importarit 
was the ultimate incompatibility of Arminianism and federal theology. Once 
the validity of the traditional covenant of grace was questioned, it was a 
simple step to revoke the national covenant. The New Lights, in contrast, 
were entirely satisfied with the demise of covenant theory, but Arminianism 
struck at the roots of their own brand of Calvinism. Individual regeneration, 
they held, was instantaneous, emotional, and completely unpremeditated. 
As such, it was totally contrasted to the Arminian conviction which held 
that salvation was a slow intellectual process, occasioned by the efforts of 
the individual to regulate his life according to God's will revealed in the 
laws of nature. 80 The Louisbourg crusade against Popery, then, was used 
by the various clerical factions in New England to symbolize the dispute 
between the Liberal Arminian doctrine of "works," the Traditionalist con-
cept of "preparation", and the Revivalist belief in "New Birth". 
If the clergy were divided on the issue of regeneration, they were less 
so in their desire to depict Louisbourg as a symbol of unity. This con-
sensus reflected the abhorence of all Massachusetts clerics towards the divi-. 
sive character of the Great Awakening and its degenerating effect on their 
group prestige and authority. 81 Consequently, the three schools of theology 
stressed the dual themes of order and unity. The Reverend Jared Eliot best 
expressed this concept of solidarity: 
If the Upper orders of men had not concurred, the expedition must 
have failed. If the lower ranks of men had not strongly engaged, the grand 
design must have come to nothing . . . All orders and degrees of men were 
so united that there was no schism in the body . . . 82 
The Traditionalists completely endorsed this view of social cohesion, but 
the New Lights remained silent. Their creed was of a profoundly individ-
ualistic character, based on the intimate and emotional relationship between 
man and God. Further, because the revivalists viewed the Great Awakening 
as Providentially directed, opposition to the phenomenon was equated with 
sin. 83 Consequently, the New Lights, while experiencing a communal 
79 Samuel NILES, Essay on God's Wonder-working Providence for New England, 
(London, 1747), 16. 
80 For a discussion of these general ideas, see Perry MILLER, "Preparation 
for Salvation", in Nature's Nation. 
81 See above, note 66. Also HEIMERT, 139, 168-169. 
82 ELIOT, 10. See also Prentice 8. 
83 Heilnert, 88 and 200, Calvinists viewed "Arminians as enemies to the 
Kingdom." 
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brotherhood among themselves, 84 exhibited little desire to be associated 
with "unconverted" Traditionalists or Arminian Liberals. 
Despite this difference regarding social solidarity, all three theological 
persuasions evidenced a desire for increased order. The Traditional Clergy 
were the most vehement supporters of stability, lamenting on the one hand 
the "tottering condition" of liberty within the province and the pervasive 
fear of war, 85 while on the other, urging obedience and respect to rulers 
and officers. 86 According to traditionalist the Reverend Thomas Prentice, 
authority was designed by God for the protection of the individual life and 
fortune. 87 The Liberal clergy had little to say on the topic of order other 
than to urge that praise be given to civil and military authorities for their 
selfless and competent leadership. New Light Sewell, however, had very 
definite opinions concerning such issues, opinions less liberal than the Rev-
erend Mr. Prentice. He first expressed a belief in the Divine right of rulers: 
By him [God] kings reign and princes decree justice. He makes rulers 
benefactors to their people, or permits tyrants to oppress them in holy 
displeasure. 
Showing little concern for personal liberty, he emphasized the right of 
poverty: 
Earthly princes have a right to govern, but this doth not give them 
the property and possession of the estates of their subjects. 88 
Not all ministers, however, were as explicit in their political beliefs as was 
Sewell. Generally, the clergy attempted to stress the unity resulting from 
the Louisbourg expedition and evidenced a hope that the disorders which 
had characterized the province prior to 17 45 would subside. 
Related to the search for order was the clergy's perception of the 
results of the fall of Cape Breton. The ministers, regardless of their theo-
logical biases, fixed upon the success at Louisbourg as a symbol of a renewed 
religious faith in New England and as a Divine call to Prayer. According 
to New Light The Reverend Thomas Prince, because admiration for God 
84 Ibid., 18. Heimert suggests this solidarity among New Lights was a Rous-
seauean communitarianism, in direct contrast to the individualism of liberal theology, 
and further, that the implicit democratic spirit was the energizing force for the Amer-
ican Revolution. Two criticisms may be made. First, The New Light concept of 
regeneration was intensely individualistic as compared to the egalitarian aspect of 
Stoddardism (see Perry MILLER, Errand into the Wilderness, (New York: 1964), 160). 
Secondly, by their very exclusiveness, the Revivalists pitted themselves against the 
combined forces of Traditional Calvinists and Liberals and were, therefore, a divisive 
rather than a unifying force in America. 
85 WALTER, II, and McCLENACHAN, I. 
86 McCLENACHAN, 14, and PRENTICE, 27. 
87 PRENTICE, 9-11. 
88 SEWELL, 14-15. If Sewell was in any fashion typical of New Light clerics, 
it would appear that Allan Heimert's conclusions are challenged. He suggests the 
Liberal clergy were practically "outright Tories" because they used Lockean rhetorics 
as "almost a justification for the status auo" in their defence of property. In contrast, 
the New Lights rejected this individualistic aspect of Locke and emphasized natural 
law and social contract. Sewell hardly falls into the latter category. See HEIMERT, 
15-18. 
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was the most noble of human thoughts, God excited these emotions by 
extraordinary examples of his Providence. Prince was convinced that he 
could discern a general disposition to prayer in Massachusetts upon the 
conclusion of the expedition. 89 While Liberals might doubt the validity 
of direct intervention, they did not doubt that the Louisbourg conquest was 
a summons to renewed faith. Preached the Reverend Charles Chauncy: 
This wonderful appearance of God for us, should excite our love, 
warm our devotion, confirm our faith, encourage our hope and inspire 
us with the firmest resolution of all holy obedience to the commandments 
of God. 90 
Like Prince, Chauncy felt he saw a spirit of prayer in Massachusetts and 
wrote, "it was this that brought us once and again publicly into the house 
of the Lord." 91 The emphasis of Traditionalists differed slightly from both 
New Lights and Liberals, largely because the jeremiad style still coloured 
their interpretation. These clerics insisted that the Cape Breton victory not 
only produced a spirit of prayer, but was, in fact, the result of prayer. 
As the Reverend Thomas Prentice explained, the conquest came "in answer 
to our humiliation and prayers," while the Reverend William McLenachan 
assured the departing troops, "the effectual fervent prayer of a righteous 
man availeth much." 92 The belief in the efficacy of prayer was a distin-
guishing feature of the jeremiad form; likewise, the ominous warnings which 
accompanied divine beneficience were a mark of federal theology. As a 
result, the Traditionalists cautioned the people of Massachusetts against 
sinful backsliding. The Reverend Thomas Prentice advised, "let us not be 
like ungrateful Israel, who when they had sung God's praises, soon forgot 
his works". The Reverend Nathanael Walter preached on a similar theme: 
What signifies it to rend Heaven with out cries for mercy and help, 
if we will hold fast to our iniquities ? . . . In a word, what signifies good 
politicks if we are bad Christians ? 93 
The Massachusetts clergy, each faction according to its theological assump-
tions and style, fixed upon Louisbourg as symbol for the revival df faith 
in their province. Much as they have projected their desire for order and 
unity into their image of the expedition, so their belief in renewed faith 
reflected their own aspirations less than reality. New Lights, Traditionalists 
and Liberals united to proclaim the return of Massachusetts to the House 
of God. 
Louisbourg symbolized clerical attitudes towards direct intervention, 
the war against antiChrist, social unity and order, and the renewal of faith 
in Massachusetts. As well, it was used as a focus to examine underlying 
beliefs concerning the validity of jeremiads and covenants, natural law and 
Biblical authority, the effectiveness of prayer and the nature of regeneration. 
89 PRINCE, 14 and 25. 
90 CHAUNCY, 21. 
91 Ibid., 8. 
92 PRENTICE, 22 and McCLENACHAN, 15. 
93 PRENTICE, 36 and WALTER, 9-10. 
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These themes were, however, subsumed in the larger debate over varying 
theories of history. It was assumed to a greater or lesser degree by New 
Lights and Traditionalists as well as Liberals, that God's will and, conse-
quently his Divine Plan, could be discovered by carefully studying events 
of the past and .present. 94 For the clergy of Massachusetts, the reduction 
of Louisbourg became a symbolic reinforcement for their particular inter-
pretations of history. 
The use of the Cape Breton conquest by the Traditionalists reflected 
their traditional Puritan attitude towards history. The original settlers had 
conceived of the historical process in terms of their mission to Christianize 
the New World and regenerate the Old. 95 Gradually the emphasis shifted 
and the scope narrowed to New England where the theme of mission was 
displaced by one of internal declention. 96 The larger Christian interpre-
tation of history assumed a gradual advance from Christ's Resurrection to 
the Millenillin. Many of these Calvinists believed, however, that history 
had been deflected by Satan and the Papacy; the Puritan mission was to 
subdue these evil forces. 97 But the first issue had, by 1700, become internal 
purity. Until a sign was given that God's controversy with New England 
had finally ended, the Puritan mission - and by implication, history -
could not proceed. With this type of outlook, it was natural that Tradi-
tionalists should consider the reduction of Louisbourg as an answer to the 
jeremiad, as proof that God had not abandoned his chosen people in their 
mission to destroy the anti-Christ. 98 The Reverend Nathanael Walter re-
flected this conviction. He referred to Massachusetts as "our New England 
Israel," argued that the conquest was a result of humiliation, confession and 
prayer, and warned against potential backsliding. 99 Similarily, the Rev-
erend Thomas Prentice considered the victory a sign of God's concern for 
New England but lamented "We find by sad experience, time is apt very 
much to wear off a sense of the divine mercies from our minds." 100 
Louisbourg, in effect, was a symbol designed to arrest the declension and 
to return New England to its special mission. If Massachusetts learned the 
lesson of Cape Breton, Prentice maintained, the Millenium would follow : 
in a shoi:t time our warfare shall be accomplished, and we shall quit the 
field of battle, with honour, and go triumphing in our spirits ... and shall 
enter the heavenly Jerusalem . . . saying, thanks to God who giveth us the 
victory ... 101 
94 Perry MILLER, Jonathan Edwards, (New York, 1959), 314; Harvey WISH, 
The American Historian, (New York, 1960), 4; Stow PERSONS, "The Cyclical Theory 
of History in Eighteenth Century America", in Cushing STROUT, Intellectual History 
in America, Vol. I, (New York, 1968), 52. 
9lS WISH, 3. 
96 HEIMERT, 62, and MILLER, "Declension in A Bible Commonwealth", passim. 
97 WISH, 3. 
98 See above, notes 74 and 75. 
99 WALTER, 17, 18 and 20. 
100 PRENTICE, 23. 
101 Ibid., 39. 
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For the Traditionals, the Louisbourg victory symbolized the return of New 
England to its proper historical mission. 
The Liberal interpretation of history was radically different from the 
Traditional Calvinist. They argued that God had established the world 
and set it in motion according to the laws of nature. 102 Consequently, 
direct Divine intervention was rejected and the role of man in determining 
his own actions was closely circumscribed. The resulting philosophy of 
history has been described as "cosmic pessimism" 103 and more concisely, 
as "the theory of organic cycles." 1-04 In essence, the Liberals felt that nations 
rose and fell in cyclical fashion according to the degree in which their be-
haviour corresponded to the moral implications of natural law. History, 
then, became a repetitive process and symbolized a constant struggle of 
reason ,and goodness against ignorance and evil. 105 While unwilling to admit 
God's direct intervention the Liberal clergy recognized the New England 
expedition against the French as part of the continuing struggle against anti-
Christian decadence. They were hesitant, however, to assume the Millenium 
had begun or that Louisbourg was in any way connected to its arrival. 
Wrote the Reverend Charles Chauncy: 
And may the happy period come on, when nations shall no more 
lift up sword against nation, nor the alarm of war be heard on earth. This 
happy time can't be expected until the Lord Jesus Christ has taken to 
himself his great power and reign; till he is seated King upon God's holy 
hill of zion and has generally subdued the lusts and passions of men ... 100 
The Liberals argued, as Channey illustrates, that the Millenium was distant, 
that it would be preceeded by the Last Judgement, and that God, not man, 
would occasion its arrival. The real symbolic value of Louisbourg for Lib-
eral clerics was that it demonstrated that Massachusetts was on the rising 
part of an historical cycle. Reduced to its simplest term, it represented the 
habitual triumph of the good and the reasonable over the ignorant and 
degenerate. 
The New Light interpretation of history differed from both Tradition-
alists and Liberals. According to the Reverend Jonathan Edwards all events 
were related as parts of God's greater design had for its purpose the ulti-
mate redemption of the world. 107 Rather than taking the Traditionalist 
position that the Millenium would follow the apocalypse, in the indefinate 
future, the New Lights preached that the new age was imminent. With 
the decisive overthrow of antiChrist, 108 Christ's kingdom on earth would 
exist for 1000 years at which time, the Last Judgement would consume 
the world. The important point is that for the New Lights, the Millenium 
102 HEIMERT, 74-75. 
103 Ibid., 70. 
104 PERSONS, 52. 
105 Ibid., 52, 54-55. 
106 CHAUNCY, 23. 
107 MILLER. Jonathan Edwards, 312. 
108 Peter GAY, A Loss of Mastery, (New York, 1966), 94-95. 
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preceded the apocalypse. 109 This view ied to the belief that at any moment 
Christ's rule might commence. 110 The Great Revival, the conversion of 
the Indians, 111 and the defeat of Popery at Louisbourg 112 became symbols 
by which to prove the actual beginning of the Millenium. Massachusetts, 
in a sense, became the centre of the New Christendom. 113 For that reason 
each event occurring in the colony was closely examined, in case it was 
found to herald the new era. 
This sense of expectancy is obvious in the New Light reaction to the 
reduction of Louisbourg. According to the Reverend Thomas Prince, all 
history flowed towards a single end and he advised his listeners to "atten-
tively mind the various springs and incidents in the run of the whole, and 
how they all surprisingly conspire to a prosperous issue." 114 This goal 
was described in historical terms by the Reverend Joseph Sewell: 
Christ makes a wonderful prophesy of the rise and reign of Antichrist, 
whooe coming is after the working of Satan ... and then his destruction by 
the vials of God's wrath poured upon him; and of the advancement of the 
Redeemer's kingdom on the ruins of the papal empire and kingdom of 
darkness. 115 
It was obvious that the New Lights considered this prophesy about to be 
realized: the conquest of Cape Breton was a clear indication that the Mil-
lenium had begun. Sewell referred to New Englanders as "us who live in 
the last Ages of the World" 116 and concluded his sermon on the reduction 
of Louisbourg by proclaiming: 
May the glorious victory be an earnest of our Lord's taking to himself 
the entire possession of this New World. May the kings of the earth that 
have given their power to the Beast, have their eyes opened . . . May Anti-
christ be utterly destroyed by the brightness of our Lord's coming . . . and 
the Kingdom of this world become the Kingdoms of our Lord ... 111 
For the New Lights, then, Louisbourg became an important symbol of the 
impending Millenium. 
It is clear that the reduction of Cape Breton was of considerable sym-
bolic significance to the clergy of Massachusetts. New Lights, Traditionalists 
and Libera:ls alike, were threatened by the religious controversies in the 
province from 17 40 to 17 45. For this reason their sermons about Louis-
bourg stressed order and social cohesion, anti-Catholicism, and the renewal 
of faith in the colony. At the same time, however, Louisbourg provided 
symbolic reinforcement for particular theological doctrines - the nature 
of Divine rule, the validity of federal theology, the character of regenera-
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tion, and finally the course of world history. For the ministers as a group 
Louisbourg provided an optimistic symbol of New England's religious 
vitality; as members of differing persuasions they found in it symbolic 
substantiation for their own particular creeds. In either case, it seemed to 
sanction the new religious heterogeneity and contributed to the growing 
pride and confidence in the province of Massachusetts. 
* * * 
John Adams wrote of the War for Independence: "The Revolution was 
in the minds of the people, and this was affected from 1760-1775 ... " 118 
In fact, the significant change in colonial thinking may have taken place by 
the middle of the 1740's. The Louisbourg expedition fell at this critical. 
juncture of Massachusetts' history, a decade which saw a shift in the basis of 
social cohesion from federal theology to a rudimentary provincial awareness. 
The conquest itself greatly accelerated this trend with monumental impli-
cations for the future of New England. Until the 1740's the religious focus 
of Massachusetts' group identity was a self-image entirely compatible with 
another role, that of a British colony in North America. When this religious 
identity was replaced with a secular pride in provincial citizenship, a self-
image was created which proved ultimately incompatible with the role of 
Massachusetts as a colony. Though open conflict was avoided for almost 
three decades, in 17 45 the revolutionary destiny of Massachusetts appeared 
to have been largely determined. 
118 Cited in BAILYN, Ideological Origins of the American Revolution, I. See 
also HEIMERT, I: "The intellectual division revealed in the Awakening. . . persisted 
long after the Revolution, and in that perspective, the struggle for Independence may 
well have been only an incidental episode." 
